Using the distinction which Richard Ashley and Rob Walker drew in 1990 between two possible critical responses to crisis and the question of sovereignty, this paper argues that two strands of thought can be identified which each produce a different understanding of what it means to become a citizen in the context of migration. One strand articulates citizenship in terms of sovereign autonomous subjectivity and thus in terms of horizontal or territorial relations between here and there, us and them, inside and outside. The other strand (re)articulates citizenship in terms of ambiguous paradoxical subjectivity which challenges rather the modern framing of the politics of citizenship as necessarily needing to be conceptualized in terms of absolute space. This divergence is explored through the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum. The concept of citizenship as 'trace' is introduced in an attempt to capture how citizenship is reconceptualized differently in the second strand. It is argued that understanding this divergence is necessary in order to consider how classical conceptions of time and space are specifically integral to structures of sovereign power and how perspectives which take these as their starting point fail to account for the increasing emphasis on the nonsovereign manner in which citizenship is being experienced vis-à-vis migration.
INTRODUCTION
These two quotes reflect a growing disbelief within citizenship scholarship that the concept of citizenship can continue to be defined according to dominant ideals and practices of solidarity located in the nation-state given the challenges which migration poses to it. However, despite a shared recognition of a purported need to problematize how belonging has been located in a national statist community which assumes common history and culture of citizens, these two authors pose very different responses to the question itself of how a new 'politics' of citizenship should be theorized in relation to the issue of migration. In considering the growing inter-disciplinary concern with the challenge which migration poses to traditional notions of what it is to be a citizen, this paper sets out to explore this tension. It argues that two strands of thought can be identified which each produce a different understanding of what it means to be(come) 'citizen' in this context. In one this is articulated in terms of sovereign autonomous subjectivity and the notion of an us/them dualism is thereby maintained by continuing to frame "the tractable puzzles of modern politics…in terms of horizontal or territorial relations between self and world, self and other, this community here and that community there" 3 ; in the other this is articulated in terms of ambiguous paradoxical subjectivity which collapses this us/them dualism and undermines the idea itself that modern politics can (only) be articulated in this way.
These strands of thought are not intended to be taken as analogous to clearly delineated and competing citizenship theories. Nor, is the implication here that all theorizations of citizenship, and therefore particular authors, necessarily fall neatly into one or the other of them. Rather, this distinction is being used here to explore a difference in approach (woven across and within citizenship studies) which exists in theorizing the question itself of what and where politics can be when it comes to citizenship and the question of how migration demands a radical retheorization of this. It will be suggested that in one strand the politics of citizenship (what 'citizen' can be) is conceptualized as that which is divided but can ultimately be reunited and therefore as extended in absolute space. In contrast to this, it will be pointed out that in the other it is reconceptualized in terms of contingent trace; as based upon disruptions and discontinuities in its own right and therefore figuring in indeterminate spaces which can only be "traced in the blur…or in mediation" 4
TWO STRANDS OF THOUGHT: ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO CRISIS AND THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
The quotation by Castles and Davidson above emphasizes a perceived need to continue to pose the question of citizenship vis-à-vis its relationship with the (sub/ supra or transnational) state. Although highlighting the challenges that migration places upon the dominant ideals and practices of solidarity conceptualized in terms of the state, it seeks nonetheless to understand this challenge in terms of how the state continues to define the parameters of solidarity in the twenty-first century. It is a response, in other words, to the rapidly increasing global phenomenon of migration which results in a call for a move away from the notion that 'genuine' citizenship is located (only) in sovereign territorial authority but towards a need to conceive of how state citizenship forms what Habermas calls "a continuum" with world citizenship. 5 Here state sovereignty (conceptualized as the relationship between nationality, territory and statehood) is problematized by questioning the manner in which this has been historically conceptualized as the dominant mode of belonging. Alternative possibilities for conceptualizing solidarity outside of this particular nationalist framing are then emphasized by asking how individuals might be positioned vis-à-vis an inter-statist or trans-statist social or symbolic order. The implication here is that political possibility is extended by thinking about political life in terms of a continuum within and between modern territorial states. However, despite taking away the supposition of conflict, the politics of citizenship (the relationship between migration policies, and understandings of what it means to become 'citizen') continues to be conceptualized here in terms of "a form of inclusion that depends on a clear pattern of spatial exclusion". 6 Instead of a world of aliens and citizens, what we are promised is a world in which belonging continues to be based on the notion of absolute spatial exclusion in the last instance; this is merely an exclusion which no longer involves treating the Other as enemy.
In contrast to this, the second quotation by Mezzadra questions the need itself of posing the politics of citizenship in terms of its relationship with the modern sovereignty territorial state. Instead of taking this relationship as a natural starting point for questions about the politics of citizenship, it suggests that it is this relationship in itself that needs to be explored in terms of how it facilitates a particular understanding of politics as a relationship among modern autonomous subjects and/or groups of modern autonomous subjects, in the first place. Quoting Chatterjee, the author implies that this relationship is problematic because it assumes homogenous as opposed to (and thus ignoring the concept of) heterogeneous space. Mezzadra thus renders problematic the notion that the (problematized) state and (deconstructed) subjectivity can be taken as analytical categories in their own right. Instead of merely presuming that the relation between citizenship and state sovereignty can be used to 'explain' and 'rethink' understandings about the nature of subjectivity and agency, his focus shifts to how citizenship and understandings of the nature of subjectivity and agency derive their meaning from claims to state sovereignty (a will to empower). 7 Unlike the first approach, this line of inquiry emphasizes the need to reflect on how our understanding of political possibility (social, cultural and economic) is limited by our need to think about political life as either within or between modern states. 8 It focuses on how our imagination is limited by our need to conceptualize the only possible ground for the 'politics' of citizenship as that which is defined in terms of the relationship between autonomous individuals (subjectivity) and the state (sovereignty). It is not merely the location (i.e. the rightful parameters) of political space (for example, whether these should be trans or intra statist) which is being questioned here. This is because it is argued that doing so continues to assume a concept of space as homogenous (limitless) insofar as we continue to think of 'being' in space in different ways and to different degrees, rather than of different conceptions of 'space'. 9 Instead, what is explored is the idea that political space itself needs to be reconceptualized. This is in terms of how it is playing out in often unexpected ways at a multiplicity of sites and the manner in which this challenges the notion itself of instantaneous static space (us/them framework) as the only possible type of political space. 10 The result is to ask, as Mezzadra does, how this reconceptualization of political space challenges the existing dominant understanding of political life as within or between states as the only way of being when it comes to the question of citizenship and the relationship between citizenship and migration. It is to ask how migration challenges not only the location and authenticity of territorial borders but also "the borders of our imagination".
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I would like to suggest that the distinction which Richard Ashley and Rob Walker once drew between two possible critical responses to crisis and the question of sovereignty, is useful in order to consider what is at stake in how 'citizens' is conceived of differently in the two strands of thought discussed here.
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First Response
On the one hand Walker and Ashley point to a response which is based on imagining the world in terms of spatially opposed positions of inside and outside and temporal continuity which is then interrupted by a unique moment of discontinuity "that opens up when…continuous time, homogeneous place, and coherent and well-bounded textual inheritance breaks up or gives away". 13 This line of reasoning posits the boundaries demarcating 'us' from 'them' in the twenty-first century as sharply brought into focus and now highly contested, but ultimately retains the basic notion of the ontological foundation of this dichotomy. That is to say, that despite the concepts of us and them now constantly undergoing deconstruction, identity (inside) continues here to be conceptualized as ontologically against difference (outside) as two separate, albeit interlinked, analytical categories which remain "constitutive of our modern understanding of political space". 14 Because the subject continues here to be conceptualized as unitary (by theorizing similarity in difference via autonomous subjectivities) 'difference' is defined in terms (always) of Other as one who can be 'included'. This means that political arrangements of sovereignty (the symbolic or social order) are seen in the last instance as separate from the processes of inscription of (grounded) subjectivity. 15 Sovereignty is seen as that which is required for reality to have meaning and thus political possibility, as opposed to that which merely facilitates a particular type of meaningful reality in terms of what has come to be understood as political possibility.
As Walker discusses in Inside/Outside, what can be identified here is the assumption that the image of the sovereign state as "fixed within precise ontological coordinates" can be applied universally. 16 Pierre Maxime Schuhl once identified this as the 'the theme of Gulliver'. 17 To assume this when it comes to the question of citizenship, as Walker discusses further in 'Citizenship after the Modern Subject' is, however, specifically to ignore the question of the historically constituted nature of subjectivity. It is to choose to ignore the decision which is taken in assuming that the limits of the modern state have always been analogous to the limits of subjectivity. We need to look at how classical physics, which assumes the independence of space from the matter which it contains and "the linearity of historical, narrativised time, time which has beginnings and ends" 25 , is constitutive of our understanding of modern 'political' subjectivity. 26 Walker's argument in relation to citizenship is that the question itself of how the politics of citizenship is being challenged cannot be divorced from this modern account of individual subjectivity that forms, to begin with, the basis for our understanding of 'political' (im)possibility in contemporary circumstances.
A Lens: The 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum
In the discussion that follows I want to explore in more detail this division among debates in Europe which specifically explore the question of whether increased regulations in this area could better be described as 'racism' or 'commonsense'. 29 In other respects, the focus in the Republic of Ireland, which was specifically on the children of migrants (often undocumented) as those who were deemed to be lacking sufficient 'connection' to the country 30 , can be seen to resonate much further afield.
This includes in the Dominican Republic which has similarly seen increased restrictions on the entitlement to birthright citizenship for the children of certain residents via discussions about the appropriate association (deemed to be best described as 'in transit') of these residents to the Dominican Republic. It will be argued that the first two forms of critical analysis (the gendered and cosmopolitan approaches) can be equated with the first response which Ashley and
Walker identified. This is on the basis of their insistence on conceptualizing challenges from migration to understandings of solidarity in terms primarily of how these have merely interrupted existing spatial and temporal boundaries and therefore can continue to be negotiated via appeals to sovereignty and thus in terms of absolute space and linear, progressive conceptions of time. As an alternative to this, it will be pointed out that the third analysis, unlike the previous two, considers how migration specifically problematizes the relationship itself between identity and the idea of absolute space which is inherent in claims to state sovereignty. It will be argued that this third approach therefore corresponds to the second response which Walker and
Ashley identified insofar as it specifically aims to deconstruct dominant understandings of the necessary relationship between identity and the location of that identity as that which must correspond to a coherent subject in the last instance in order to speak about a 'politics' of citizenship.
RETHEORIZING CITIZENSHIP: A POST-RACIAL MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP
The referendum campaign was conducted using gendered, racialized discourses of blame against migrant women who were allegedly having babies solely to gain Irish citizenship for their children… -Lentin and Luibhéid 33 In 2004 the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution was passed (by a four to one majority) in the Republic of Ireland. This saw the existing automatic constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship for people born to 'non-national' parents removed and replaced with a residency requirement. 34 The existing automatic constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship, inserted in 1998 as Article 2, declared that it was both the entitlement and birthright of "every person born in the island of Ireland...to be part of the Irish Nation and to be citizens of Ireland". 35 However, in 2004 the Irish Government argued that automatic entitlement to Irish citizenship had begun to pose a threat to Irish sovereignty insofar as it was restricting the state's ability to regulate entry into and residence within the state and providing a 'backdoor' into Europe. As proof of this threat, the Government pointed to the increase in the rate of births to non-national women in recent years. They argued that the automatic entitlement to birthright citizenship was creating an incentive for people from abroad to travel to Ireland to give birth and secure Irish citizenship for their children which in turn was producing a number of Irish citizen children who lacked sufficient 'connection' to Ireland. A "disproportionate number" of non-national mothers giving birth in Irish hospitals was at the time attributed specifically to the birth rate among asylum seekers (which at 58% was seen as "an extraordinarily high rate in comparison to normal population standards") and to 'anecdotal' evidence of women flying into the country on tourist visas to give birth, collect a passport for their children and return home. 36 In 2004 the electorate was therefore asked, and agreed by a 79.2% majority, to amend the existing automatic constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship by inserting the following additional clause into the Constitution: community. In doing so, it argues that so-called common-sense responses are in fact racialized attempts to control "not only in-migration but also the self-definition of existing collectivities within". 39 The way in which this must be subverted, it maintains, is by beginning to (re)imagine the possibility of political community outside and beyond the clearly delineated boundaries of the nation state so as to facilitate "an interrogation of how the Irish nation can become other than white (Christian and settled)". 40 It argues that only in this manner can we begin to imagine understandings of belonging which are 'inclusive' as they will no longer be dictated by the exclusionary, racist boundaries of the Irish statist project. [t]he inescapable conclusion is that non-national parents, whether based in Ireland or not, quite reasonably perceive an advantage by giving birth in Ireland to a child who thereby becomes an Irish, and thus an EU citizen 45 Yet it is precisely this 'fact' of a direct correlation between the constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship and of the actions of migrant parents, in particular migrant mothers, which is disputed. In the first instance, it has been pointed out that the practice of late arrival in the three main maternity hospitals in Dublin is far from an uncommon occurrence, with Irish citizens as well as so-called non-nationals presenting late in this manner. 46 This has led to questions as to why it was therefore specifically migrant women who had been singled out in this regard by being "signified as 'other' and stereotyped as sexually active child-makers, deliberately subverting Irish norms of citizenship and nationality". 47 Fanning is insistent here that this cosmopolitan model of citizenship is based on "a realistic conception of the limits of solidarity" which acknowledges that in a world without the right to have rights, it is nation-states which (will) remain centre stage. 55 His argument is that it is states and states alone "which integrate immigrants or otherwise manage them as part of an ongoing process of economic, social, political and organizational nation-building". 56 Therefore, and echoing the point made by
Castles and Davidson in the quote which opened this paper, he maintains that any solution to the challenges which immigration poses to dominant ideals and practices of solidarity needs to focus on how we can (continue to) resolve understandings about what and where political community can be, in terms of claims to state sovereignty.
The idea of 'inclusion' presented here is always as inclusion of a coherent subject in the last instance -normally 'immigrants' and or 'ethnic minorities'. This is done by conceiving of subjectivity in a similar manner to that of how political community is conceived: as that which fluid margins, but also edges which can be filled. The conception of space presented here is therefore absolute, infinite but most importantly, homogenous. Similarly, time is conceived here singularly as progressive:
one becomes a citizen having not previously been one. The shift is from 'old' forms of citizenship and groups of old citizens to 'new' forms of citizenship and groups of new citizens. The possibility itself for the renegotiation of the relationship between citizenship and immigration is thus reaffirmed here anew in terms of absolute and independent space as well as linear, continuous and progressive time. This is to point out that despite attempts to deconstruct 'Irishness' and its association with the idea of an originary identity, the alternative emphasis here on 'guest' versus 'host' results in a certain reinforcing of the idea itself of how we are supposed to (continue to) think about the relationship between immigration and what it means to be(come) a citizen.
As the increasing use of the term 'new Irish' attests to, this is the idea that we must think this relationship via specific spatial and temporal notions of difference and identity where difference is understood to intersect with, but remains in the last instance, spatially external to, and following temporally in the wake of, identity. space. This is an understanding of subjectivity as based on a continuing essence in (as opposed to 'of') time and space which is split between a particular identity (citizen) and a universal identity ('Wo/Man'). Although these accounts have produced an alternative history of Ireland as a multi-ethnic society which is made up of various identities -old Irish/new Irish, host/guest, minority/majority -rather than a history in which there is just one authentic identity (Celtic), the argument made here is that this has been done without ultimately undermining the opposition itself (conceptualized in terms of homogenous, invariable space and linear, progressive time) between notions of 'us' and 'them', this community and that community, between 'here' and 'there'.
I now intend to explore a socio-spatial analysis of the 2004 Irish citizenship
Referendum and discuss how this specifically challenges said understandings of the relationship between citizenship and immigration which posit subjectivity in terms of absolute space. It will be suggested in the final section that this challenge can be understood in terms of how it provides the conceptual space to consider subjectivity rather as 'trace'; as contingent spaces which make impossible the notion of a coherent 'I' which can be included or excluded in the first place. As will be discussed, this is insofar as the socio-spatial analysis is a response which undermines the notion of a coherent 'self' which corresponds to a solid body and is always containable "within a unified narrative or bounded political community". 58 and 'girl/mother'. 63 In doing so White and Gilmartin draw attention to how the idea of a sovereign autonomous subject makes little sense in relation to these cases. Their work points out that it is not possible here to think 'citizen' in time-space coordinates as normally associated with the understanding of a progression from the space of childhood on one hand to that of motherhood on the other. Rather, their work emphasizes that the boundaries themselves are collapsed here between the already
born and yet unborn 'child' and between 'child' as foetus and 'mother' as woman.
The result is 'citizen' of multiple time-space coordinates; each resulting from the different configurations of how the relationship between state, family and unborn child is articulated.
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Here we see a shift in focus from casting citizenship and the meaning of what it is to be 'citizen' in terms of a metaphysics of homogenous absolute space according to which an us/them dualism make sense, to that of casting it in terms of a metaphysics of heterogeneous contingent spaces in which this dualism itself is collapsed as identity and difference are no longer defined in terms of an ability to separate inside from outside. Suddenly, this notion of needing to bring migrant and Irish together within a more inclusive conception of citizenship is no longer the only way of thinking about the relationship between migration and what it means to be a citizen. Instead, because the notion of 'citizen' is reconceptualized as lacking in itself a unified basis, the relationship between identity (citizen) and difference (migrant) becomes more ambiguous. It becomes less recognizable in terms of an ability to draw lines in the final instance between those outside and those inside the dominant imagined community, between 'migrant' and 'non-migrant', between 'host' and 'newcomer', between the past (old Irish) and the present (new Irish). These spaces are no longer so easily idealized as solid bodies analogous to the image of the sovereign territorial state which exists in linear time moving from the past to the present and back again, but rather as often retrospectively produced, highly ambiguous 'traces'.
The implication is that the relationship between reproductivity and residency needs to be set in terms of an appreciation of the interrelated (and often contradictory)
identities-spaces around which political and legal claims have been organized to date, not all of which are sovereign spaces. What is opened up here is a 'supplementary'
space of subjectivity and thus of being 'citizen'. This is not, however, a different coordinate in existing time-space understandings which simply 'adds up' to another space in time in which the sovereign subject experiences citizenship -as, for example, the concept of 'new Irish' alludes to. Rather this is a supplementary space that suggests that adding 'to' need not 'add up', but may rather disturb the existing calculation. 65 Here, the notion of 'citizen' envisaged as mother with child or mother/child is never enough. Instead the claim to citizenship is always in excess of either the space or time of 'mother' or 'child'. Citizenship thus becomes that which redraws the frontiers of 'difference' in such a way "that never quite adds up, always less than one…and double". 66 Subjectivity is still conceptualized here as comprising identity and difference but difference (outside) is no longer necessarily spatially or temporally distinct from identity (inside). Difference is rather conceptualized as "an otherness…without boundary, without end. An otherness barely touched upon and that already moves away". response to the challenges presented by migration in the twenty-first century, is to some extent constrained in advance. This is because it is predetermined by how the notion of political possibility is defined in the first place as 'being' (citizens) within or beyond modern territorial states, bringing with it the need to think in terms of sovereign subjectivity in the last instance. Notwithstanding the difference in emphasis on how the tension between sovereignty and subjectivity should be negotiated, the point is that the overall focus of both approaches remains on the need to 'bring in' certain people who have been left outside of the dominant imagined community and therefore on their assumed ability to be brought in in a coherent fashion. In contrast to this, it has been suggested that the socio-spatial response indicates an alternative way of conceiving of political subjectivity. This is one which does not conform to conceptions of personhood that focus on the individual and thus on a coherent self which is positioned vis-à-vis the state but which opens up an alternative understanding of being 'citizen' via a conception of space (and time) as a series of disruptions and discontinuities.
The point is not that socio-spatial concepts of citizenship are therefore necessarily 'better' than non socio-spatial concepts of citizenship. On the contrary, the political nature of both is stressed here. Rather, what is being underlined is the need to consider the manner in which, unlike in non socio-spatial articulations, the possibility for be(coming) 'citizen' is being conceptualized in socio-spatial concepts of citizenship in often highly unfamiliar and increasingly unrecognizable ways. In order to understand why we might want to explore this it is pointed out here that critical citizenship studies has focused in recent years on the manner in which citizenship is increasingly being experienced in highly irregular ways which often do not make sense according to dominant 'political' horizons. These studies show that the normal straightforward processes through which citizens have been understood to be made and unmade need to be rethought in terms of increasing ambiguity and contradiction. or insecure forms of immigrant status. 70 McNevin points out that in many cases the forms of political subjectivity produced here -for example, involving undocumented students who have grown up in the U.S and therefore do not unambiguously belong elsewhere but nonetheless will graduate from U.S universities without the right to work in the U.S -do not therefore make sense in terms of existing fixed territorial identities whether these are trans, intra or supra statist. They need rather to be well as to all types of (m)others. These are people who are already tied in many ways to the society in which they have grown up in; albeit in ways which are often not so easy to fit into traditional notions of inclusion and exclusion which can be associated with a conception of time as a progression between past and present, the national and the international. Instead, what is increasingly evident is that even being born a 'citizen' does not preclude it being "rendered inoperable, or irregularized" in other respects. 74 An alternative concept of time is presented here to that of progressive time insofar as it becomes possible to imagine how exclusions can continue to be experienced despite someone having 'acquired' citizenship status -for example, to imagine how the citizens born to migrant parents will not always necessarily be recognized as 'citizens', nor their children in future generations to come. 75 Yet, both the gendered and the cosmopolitan approaches offered fail to imagine how Irish citizen children might be citizens in this regard because they continue to think within the understanding of a particular type of politics: this is "the politics of drawing lines"
and anticipating mobilities between here and there, between identity and difference, between us and them. 76 In contrast, the sociospatial approach discussed presents the conceptual space to imagine how Irish citizen children born to migrant parents, as those who are neither inside or outside the state but who occupy both positions at once, can be conceptualized as 'citizens'. This is because unlike the gendered and cosmopolitan analysis of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum where the notion of an us/them dualism is merely neutralized, this dualism is collapsed in itself. It is no longer taken for granted that subjectivity must be defined in terms of (a universal humanity that transcends or compliments) the state, and therefore as coherent and sovereign in time This paper has sought to explore a divergence in citizenship studies literature in relation to the approach itself to the question of how a new 'politics' of citizenship should be theorized in response to the issue of migration -as that which must be conceptualized vis-à-vis its relationship with the sub/ supra or transnational state, or not. It has suggested that what is at stake in this divergence is the difference between a continued understanding of political subjectivity in terms of an us/them, here/there, past/present dualism in the final instance, or an attempt to specifically undermine this.
The former has been discussed in terms of how it (re)produces a conception of what it means to become a 'citizen' in terms of the absolute and coherent space of self as that which can resist the state and be(come) (re)included in the statist project; the latter has been shown to introduce a conception of contingency which makes impossible the notion of a coherent self which sits at the centre of claims to the right itself to resist and/or be included in the statist project. As White and Gilmartin point out, despite the "aura of fixity and permanence, our discussions and arguments reveal how these It is not argued here that a better ontology necessarily gives us a better politics. 81 What is being argued, however, is that a better ontology gives us the ability to see the different ways in which the politics of citizenship can, and more importantly, is being articulated. The notion of trace presented here is best understood as an attempt to consider how so many people are already responding to the ongoing challenges to dominant understanding of the relationship between space, time and matter associated with classical physics. As Edkins points out, it is not that we need to catch up with ways of thinking about time and space in light of contemporary scientific analysis. 82 † Rather we need to understand how classical conceptions of time and space are integral to structures themselves of sovereign power. We therefore need to ask ourselves how we can continue to tease out the conceptual difficulties in understanding these challenges given the continuing dominance of this power structure. 
Notes
